Tag Archives: artificial intelligence

Main room for the hackathon held at the public library of Trento, Italy, during the Spaghetti Open Data Reunion 2016. Photo credit: Hjfocs, CC-BY.SA 4.0 https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Spaghetti_Open_Data_Reunion_2016_Hackathon_02.jpg

The open data centaurs: interacting with data via LLM-assisted structured queries

My brothers- and sisters-in-arm of Ondata have been exploring ways to use LLMs to facilitate their interactions with online sources of open and statistical data. In so doing, they have hit on a working style that I find very promising.

The obligatory disclaimer: I do not endorse “artificial intelligence”, a highly controversial socio-technological construct. As an economist, I am irked by the economic aspects of the tech: the insane concentration indices in this industry, the information asymmetries, the gigantic losses associated with the expansion of its customer base, its “dogshit unit economics”, to quote Ed Zitron, its massive environmental and social costs, its dark politics that makes it gravitate towards disinformation and deepfakes. I could go on, but you get the idea. This is probably preaching to the choir anyway, given that most people I hang out with are very skeptical of anything that smacks of “AI”.

And yet, Andrea Borruso and Matteo Fortini (among, undoubtedly, many others) have proposed an approach that I quite like. It goes like this: if you ask a data-related question to a LLM, such as “is the unemployment rate in Guatemala growing faster or slower than that in Ethiopia?”, you get better than even odds that the LLM will just make something up. A more reliable approach is to download the pertinent data from an authoritative source, and see for yourself. Andrea and Matteo, as honoured elders in the Italian open data community, are no strangers to tracking down data warehouses, poring over API documentation, building structured queries and feeding the result of those queries to scripts that will tease answers out of the data. And their substantial experience tells them, inequivocally, that having to do this work every time you want a question asked sucks big time.

But they found an alternative: codifying their deep knowledge of structured data and structured metadata in ways that are legible to an LLM. Then, instead of asking the LLM the direct question, they can instruct it to look up the data at the source – say, the World Bank’s data warehouse. This is possible because, after 20 years of open data movement, authoritative data to address many of those questions exist, and are structured. For example, there exists an ISO standard for machine-to-machine exchange on statistical data, called SDMX and followed by many statistics agencies. So, Andrea built OpenSDMX, a command-line interface that interacts with SDMX-compliant data sources. Give it a search term (unemployment rate Guatemala), and it will search the catalog, find the relevant datasets based on the metadata, and return a menu of options of what to download. For example, do you only want to know the most recent estimate of the unemployment rate, or would you like a time series? If sub-national data are available, do you want them too? Perhaps a disaggregation by sex, or age group? And so on.

OpenSDMX works well on its own, but it was set up so that you can interact with it via any LLM. This is done via something called a skill, which is a human-readable file containing the instructions necessary to use the command line interface well. To a human it reads like good documentation: to a LLM it is a long, detailed, well structured prompt. Thanks to it, LLMs can turn the instructions of their human operator into a structured flow of interactions with SDMX-compliant data sources by means of well-formed SDMX queries – there is no need to guess, because the skill contains correct, unambiguous structures written and validated by someone like Andrea and Matteo, who knows the standard well. Further specifications of the skill (more text files) address the quirks not disciplined by the SDMX standard itself. For example, while EUROSTAT (the European Union’s statistics agency) and ISTAT (Italy’s) both comply with SDMX, the former labels its variables in lowercase, and the latter in uppercase. This is the type of quirk known for causing lots of mild irritation to data scientists: having it encoded in the skill means your LLM benefits from the experience of veteran data scientists, even if you do not bother to read the skill.

The approach works not only for statistical data, but for any kind of data and metadata as long as they are exposed according to a standard. Another conceptually similar project built by Andrea is a Model Control Protocol (MCP) server to interact with open data portals and their content. This is possible, again, because the information therein is structured according to well-documented standards. Most open data portals are built on CKAN, and the datasets hosted therein follow another standard, DCAT. The logic is the same: open data portals are somewhat standard, and over the years the community has produced lore about how to whisper to them so that they will return the data we want. Encode that lore into text files that an LLM can interpret as a prompt. Then use the LLM as a natural-language interface to the data.

In social and economic research, it happens quite often that you have a hunch that can, in principle, be validated, or disproven, by looking at data. Andrea’s and Matteo’s approach greatly reduces the distance between formulating a question and getting an initial answer. It is even more useful when you have not a question, but a hunch, and you want to get an initial look at the raw data to see if you are even remotely right.

I decided to test OpenDMX as a way to validate or invalidate a conjecture. My conjecture was:

Within the European Union, Eastern European member states are undergoing more economic upheaval than average.

I wanted to test this conjecture by comparing the rates of business creation and business destruction (as captured by the creation of new companies and the cessation of existing ones). Furthermore, I want to do it by looking at sub-national-level data, if they exist. The idea is that upheaval is in the extremes, not in the averages: I am looking at the location of regions where business creation and destruction are unusually fast. To be clear, this is a completely unfounded conjecture, but it is a conjecture of the kind that economists make all the time, so it is valid as a test.

I launched an LLM and called up the skill, then wrote a prompt:


> /sdmx-explorer
> Business creation and business cessation rates in European Union            
   countries, geographically disaggregated   

This gets me:

 I have found the primary datasets on Eurostat that cover business creation
  (births) and cessation (deaths) with regional disaggregation.

  The most relevant dataset is BD_SIZE_R, which provides comprehensive business
  demography data down to the NUTS 3 region level (the most granular regional
  level in the EU, roughly equivalent to provinces or counties).

  Candidate Datasets

   1. BD_SIZE_R — Business demography by size class and NUTS 3 region ⭐
      Recommended
       * Coverage: All enterprises (including those with no employees).
       * Key Indicators: Number of births, number of deaths, birth rate (%),
         death rate (%), and net growth rate.
       * Dimensions: Region (NUTS 3), economic activity (NACE Rev. 2), and size
         class.
       * Timeframe: Typically annual data.

   [...]

  How would you like to proceed?
   - Would you like to explore BD_SIZE_R (all enterprises) or focus on
     employer-only data?
   - Do you want to see the specific regions or economic sectors (NACE)
     available?
   - Are you interested in a specific year or a recent comparison?

Good to know I can make a sectorial analysis by NACE codes, but no need to make this complicated right now. I want to see if there are macro differences between regions. For the same reason, I am not going to go into dynamic analysis, just get a snapshot. If I don’t see anything there is probably nothing to see, and then no point splitting hairs by doing sophisticated analysis on barely perceptible phenomena. So:

 > Use BD_SIZE_R at NUTS 3 disaggregation. For each NUTS3 region, get birth and 
   death rate. Write to console the URL to the original query for verification  
   purposes. Next, create a scatterplot where each NUTS3 region is a point. Put 
   birth rates on the Y-axis and death rates on the X-axis. Do not label        
   datapoints for legibility. Color-code them according to macro-region:        
   Western, Northern, Eastern and Southern Europe. In the legend, provide a     
   list of the countries included in each region.

And I got:

I have completed the analysis of business birth and death rates across
  European NUTS 3 regions.

  Verification URL
  You can verify the original query and data structure directly on the Eurostat
  portal:
  https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/BD_SIZE_R/default/table?lang=en
  (https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/BD_SIZE_R/default/table?lang=e
  n)

  European Macro-Regions (Legend)
  The scatterplot color-codes regions based on the following grouping:

   * Western Europe: Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), France (FR), Germany (DE),
     Ireland (IE), Luxembourg (LU), Netherlands (NL), Switzerland (CH)
   * Northern Europe: Denmark (DK), Estonia (EE), Finland (FI), Iceland (IS),
     Latvia (LV), Lithuania (LT), Norway (NO), Sweden (SE)
   * Eastern Europe: Bulgaria (BG), Czechia (CZ), Hungary (HU), Poland (PL),
     Romania (RO), Slovakia (SK)
   * Southern Europe: Croatia (HR), Cyprus (CY), Greece (EL), Italy (IT), Malta
     (MT), Portugal (PT), Slovenia (SI), Spain (ES)

  Results Summary
   * Data Source: Eurostat BD_SIZE_R (Business demography by size class and NUTS
     3 region).
   * Indicator: Birth rate (ENT_BRTHR_PC) and Death rate (ENT_DTHR_PC).
   * Geographic Detail: NUTS 3 disaggregation (counties/provinces).
   * Latest Data: Most regions reflect data from 2021 or 2022.

  The generated scatterplot scatter_demografia_final.png shows the correlation
  between business creation (Y-axis) and cessation (X-axis). Regions along the
  diagonal have a stable business population, while those above the diagonal are
  growing and those below are experiencing a net contraction in the number of
  active enterprises.

After some beautification I got a scatterplot that tells the story I was looking for.

My hunch, it turns out, is not supported by the data. If anything, it is northern regions in the EU that are experiencing a high churn. Those green dots towards the right of the chart represent Estonian territories, with a Finnish one that is an outlier and not even shown. But this is not the point here. The point is this: investigating this hunch required me to think like an economist. I can formulate a testable hypothesis. I know what economic data can and cannot say. I have learned to stay away from overinterpreting them. The LLM here thinks like a data scientist, borrowing Andrea’s expertise. It knows how to look inside the EUROSTAT data warehouse, read its labels, and build well-formed queries in SDMX format. It also has access to Python libraries for simple data visualizations. This means that, in minutes, I can get to a very rough test of my hunch.

That makes me a centaur. I am borrowing the word from Cory Doctorow. He thinks that LLMs can be used to empower humans to do better and faster things that humans do, or, viceversa, to boss over humans so that LLMs themselves can do things that they themselves cannot do. In the first case, the composite of human and machine is a centaur, a human being running around with the strength and speed of a machine. In the second, it is a reverse centaur, where the human part of the composite is a meat appendage to the machine making all the decisions, or an accountability sink, there to take the blame for when the LLMs screw up. I am a centaur here, whereas an Amazon delivery driver is a reverse centaur, with the machine part micromanaging the human and forcing him to pee in a bottle so as to squeeze the last cent of value from his labour.

Since well before LLMs, the open data movement believes that, by taking care of data (collecting them with intent, documenting them, publishing them with open license, creating tools that people can use to access and process them), you could empower people to do more. An important category of people that we cared about empowering are journalists, researchers, activists: whoever needs knowledge to make a difference. These new LLM-compatible tools come from this lineage. An investigative journalist can now type a natural-language question, such as “which datasets do we have about flood damage in Latin America?”, and the CKAN MCP server will trigger a series of queries that will look for CKAN-powered open data portal, and then look within their catalogs for appropriate datasets. It will even do this independent of the language that the journalist is typing in, and that the datasets are documented in.

Needless to say, none of this is possible if data are not curated, documented, published in machine-readable format, following open standards, with good metadata. In other words, none of this is possible if we do not treat the data as a digital public good, and do the work of documenting and publishing in the interest of those that will come after us. That is not easy to do, and even public sector organizations will in general not do it in the absence of firm policies. 

But when it is done, it can be incredibly empowering. Ukrainian open data activist Nadiia Babynska Virna reports using Andrea’s CKAN MCP server in combination with a locally-run LLM to check the openness of public sector information with no code and only basic data science skills, “in the middle of a war”. Centaur. Conclusion: while my hunch about the geography of economic upheaval was unfounded, Doctorow’s own centaur/reverse centaur model holds. In his words, it’s not what the technology does, it’s who the technology – and, I would add, the data – is for, and who it is done to.

Sociopathic innovation: how we are investing most in the most evil technologies (LONG)

TL;dr

Artificial intelligence and the blockchain are the two main technological hypes of the past fifteen years. Both were hailed as technologies with the potential to solve many problems and change the world, for the better. It now looks like their impact is overwhelmingly negative. Though they could be used for the common good, it turns out they are not very good at that. They are better, far better, at harming humans than at helping them. They encode dystopian, sociopathic world views; and tend to attract developers, investors and entrepreneurs that share those world views. So, once deployed, they tend to bring the world closer to them. They are sociopathic tech. This is disturbing, because mostly everyone fell for them: investors, developers, entrepreneurs, academics, government officials. I call for a re-examination of the achievements of these technologies and the impact they are having on our life and our societies. I would like to see support to innovation systems depend on how new technologies improve the well-being of humans and of the planet, and only on that. In what follows, I review some of the facts as a discussion starter.

Of how Artificial Intelligence excels at everything, except solving problems that matter

I recently had the opportunity to be exposed to the work of Juan Mateos-Garcia, a leading data scientist. Juan and his team had been looking at a large dataset of science papers published on the topic of Artificial Intelligence (AI). Their results look like this:

  1. AI has been undergoing a revolution since about 2012, when deep learning started to systematically outperform established techniques.
  2. Scientific production (papers) is booming. AI is shaping to be a general-purpose technology, like electricity or computing itself.
  3. Industry interest is evident. Many top scientists have been recruited from academia into industry. Venture capitalists have moved to invest in AI startups. Major governments are underwriting large public investments. There are talks of a “AI arms race” between China, the USA and the EU.
  4. AI is dominated by a small number of organisations and geographic clusters. Diversity of its workforce has stagnated.
  5. AI has had no impact on the effort to beat back the COVID-19 pandemic. In fact, all other things being equal, a paper on COVID is more likely to be cited by other papers if it is not about AI.

This final point gave me pause. Something was off. Why would AI not make a valid contribution to fighting the COVID plague? The conditions all seemed to be in place: there was, and still is, plenty of funding for research on COVID. There is a large, inelastic demand for the applications of that research, like vaccines. There is plenty of training data being generated by health care institutions the world over. And, if AI is a general purpose technology, it should apply to any problem, including COVID. The most exciting technology of the moment somehow failed to contribute to solving the most pressing problem of the moment. Why is that?

I can imagine a world where AI is deployed to help in the fight against a pandemic. We would use it to engineer a more targeted response to the risks of contagion. Granular risk scores could be associated to individual people and different situations, allowing society to protect the most vulnerable people from the riskiest situations, while leaving low-risk individuals in low-risk contexts free to get on with their lives.

Sounds good, but that world is not the one we live in. In our world, AI-powered, individually customized COVID restrictions would run into non-tractable problems. First, the algos would seize the high correlation between different socio-demographic variables, and decide that poor people, people of color and (in America) trumpists are more prone to the contagion, and should stay at home more than white, affluent liberals. Discriminated groups would react fighting back, challenging the algos as biased, starting litigation and inviting to civil disobedience, as is happening time and time again. Even if there was no conflict and everybody trusted the algos, it is not clear how we would use effectively the predictions they make for us. First of all, there is the cognitive challenge of understanding the predictions. You could tell someone something like this: “the risk of catching COVID on public transport for someone with your demographic profile went up 20% today, avoid the bus if you can”. But that is unlikely to work, because

  • Most people do not understand risk. For example, they are more scared of terrorist attacks than they are of car crashes, though the latter are far more frequent (hence more dangerous) than the former.
  • AI is Bayesian statistics, and as such it makes prediction not on you, but on somebody who is like you in a quantifiable way. It leaves out everything that makes you unique, putting it in the error term. For example, imagine you are a 45-year old living in the Netherlands who is also an ultra-marathoner. The algo computing your risk factor processes your age and the country you live in, because it has thick enough data in those dimensions. Your ultramarathons stay in the error term, because there are not enough people doing ultramarathons for that activity to be tracked in its own variable. And yet, when looking at the overall resilience of your organism, this is clearly an important information.

Given this situation, I suspect most people would end up following their own belief system rather than the algo’s recommendations. People who fancy themselves strong and resilient might say “yes, this gizmo is predicting high risk, but it is not talking about me, I am healthier and stronger than most!”. Or, vice versa, “yes, a low risk is predicted for outdoor mingling, but with my history of allergies I still don’t feel safe”. This is de facto happening right now with how people process scientific findings about COVID-19. Some people prefer to trust their own immune systems over the pharma-punditry complex. Others [made COVID restrictions into some kind of weird religion], following them “above and beyond” even when science is calling for their relaxations. Even if a good AI-powered risk prediction system were in place , many humans are way too irrational to take full advantage of it. They prefer simple rules, applicable to all: “1.5 meters”, “wash your hands” and such. The promise of AI, providing personalized recommendation to each and every one of us, clashes with the human need for stability and security. In conclusion, AI had no grip on COVID, and is unlikely to have any grip on any similar high-stakes problem. So, what is AI good for? We can start with the applications already being developed:

With the exception of machine translation, these applications are all detrimental to human well-being, for world-eating values of “detrimental”. We are seeing yet another example of Kranzberg’s First Law in action: AI is not good, nor is it evil, nor is it neutral. It could be used for good, though I am unconvinced it would work very well: but it is when you use it for evil, dehumanizing purposes that it really shines. That such a potentially toxic technology is attracting so much attention, public funding and private investment is a spectacular societal and policy failure. And that brings me to the blockchain.

Of the blockchain and its discontents

The blockchain, as by now everyone had to learn, is the name of a family of protocols that allow data storage not in a single repository, but in many. Using cryptography, the different computers who adhere to the same protocol validate each other’s copy of the database. This prevents a “rogue” participant from altering the records, as the alteration would only be present in a single computer and not be validated by the others. This system was first proposed to solve a problem called double spending when no trusted, centralized authority is present.

That was in 2008. In these 13 years, blockchain solutions have been proposed for many, many problems. To my knowledge, none worked, or at least none worked any better than competing solutions that used a more conventional database architecture. This makes sense, because blockchains are self-contained systems. They use cryptography to certify that in-database operations took place, but cannot certify anything that exists outside the database. Any system based on a blockchain relies on external sources of information, known as “oracles”. For example, if you were to build an identity system based on the blockchain, you would have to start by associating your name, date of birth etc. to a long string of digits. Once stored on the blockchain, the association is preserved, but some external “oracle” has to certify it before it gets stored. In the absence of a credible external certification, the system could work technically, but it would produce no impact. I could create my own identity system, but no one would use it, because I am not trustable enough when I issue a digital ID to your name. There are entities with the trustability to start such a system, for example major governments. But, because they are trustable, they do not need the blockchain at all. I have lost count of technologists who told me:

Any technology which is not an (alleged) currency and which incorporates blockchain anyway would always work better without it. (source)

But the blockchain is not just another clever technical solution in search of a problem to solve. I argue it is a major source of problems in itself. Consider this:

  • The distribution of Bitcoins is extremely unequal, with a Gini coefficient estimated at 0.95 in 2018 (theoretical maximum: 1; Lesotho, the most unequal country on the planet for which we have data: 0.65). In fact, inequality seems to be a feature of blockchains, not just of Bitcoin – for example, it is estimated]that the bulk of the monetary value conjured by Ethereum-based non-fungible tokens (NFTs) is appropriated by “already big-name artists and designers”.
  • Blockchains use a lot of power. Every update anywhere in the system needs to be validated by network consensus, which includes a lot of computers exchanging data. Bitcoin alone consumes about 150 Terawatt per hour, more than Argentina. Providing computer power to the Bitcoin network is rewarded in Bitcoins, through a process known as “mining”: this provides the incentive to underwrite all this computation. In bid to make what they see as easy money, Bitcoin miners have resorted to malware that infects people’s computers and gets them to compute SHA-256, incorporated into the builds of open source software projects; resurrected mothballed power stations that burn super-dirty waste coal; installed mining operations in Iranian mosques (which get electricity for free) and engaged in plain stealing. Their carbon footprint is enormous: one Bitcoin transaction generates the same amount of CO2 as 706,605 swipes of a Visa credit card. Some blockchains have less computationally expensive systems of verifications, but they are still more energy- and CO2-intensive than traditional databases.
  • Fraud – especially to the detriment of less experienced investors – is rampant in crypto.
  • Crypto has provided a monetization channel for ransomware attacks. Ransoms are demanded and paid in Bitcoin, untraceable by Interpol. Some observers go so far as to claim that the price of Bitcoin is tied to the volume of ransomware attacks. Hospitals and other health care institutions are among the main targets of these attacks: not only do they have to pay money, but their IT systems shut down, threatening the lives of patients.
  • In 2021, tech companies that used to donate CPU power to legitimate projects have had to stop doing so, citing the constant abuse from crypto miners. It is worth quoting the words of Drew DeVault:

Cryptocurrency has invented an entirely new category of internet abuse. CI services like mine are not alone in this struggle: JavaScript miners, botnets, and all kinds of other illicit cycles are being spent solving pointless math problems to make money for bad actors. \[…\] Someone found a way of monetizing stolen CPU cycles directly, so everyone who offered free CPU cycles for legitimate use-cases is now unable to provide those services. If not for cryptocurrency, these services would still be available. (source)

In return for this list of societal bads, so far, all the blockchain has to offer is a plethora of speculative financial assets: a casino. Which is also a societal bad, if you, like top innovation economist Mariana Mazzucato, believe that the economy is overfinancialized, and that policies should be put in place to roll financialization way back.

The blockchain is, overall, a net societal bad: it consumes resources to deliver a casino. Humanity would be better off without it. The picture gets even grimmer when you consider the opportunity costs: blockchain startups have gobbled an estimated 22 billion USD in venture capital funding from 2016 to 2021, very likely matched by various forms of government support, and that money could have been used in more benign ways. So, what’s going on here? Kranzberg’s First Law, yet again.

The original group of developers that rallied around Satoshi’s Nakamoto White Paper had a libertarian ideology: they dreamed of a trustless society, where contact is reduced to a minimum and anonymised, and were obsessed with property rights. So, they built a technology that encodes those values, which in turn attracted more people than believe in those values. Code is law, they said. If someone can technically do something, that something is allowed, even moral, under some kind of tech version of social Darwinism. When the DAO was hacked in 2016, exploiting vulnerabilities in the Ethereum blockchain, the perpetrator bragged about it: if I stole your money, it’s your own fault, because code is law. I am just smarter than you, and I deserve to walk away with your money.

Trustless societies do exist – the mob is one of them. But they are not a good place to live. Economists and social scientists think of trust as social capital, and seek ways to build it up, via accountability and transparency. Again, the blockchain could conceivably be used for something good, but in practice almost all of its uses contribute to making the world a worse place, while making money for the top 0.1% of crypto holders. This is because the tech itself embodies evil values, and because the social coalition behind it upholds these values. Don’t take it from me, take it from open source developer Drew DeVault:

Cryptocurrency is one of the worst inventions of the 21st century. I am ashamed to share an industry with this exploitative grift. It has failed to be a useful currency, invented a new class of internet abuse, further enriched the rich, wasted staggering amounts of electricity, hastened climate change, ruined hundreds of otherwise promising projects, provided a climate for hundreds of scams to flourish, created shortages and price hikes for consumer hardware, and injected perverse incentives into technology everywhere. (source)

Or writer and designer Rachel Hawley:

NFTs seem like an on-the-nose invention of an anticapitalist morality play: a technology that delivers exponential gains to those already at the top by convincing everyone to collectively imagine that free, widely distributed artwork is actually a scarce commodity, all while destroying the _actual_ scarce resources of our planet. (source)

Or economist Nouriel Roubini, testifying to the U.S. Senate:

Until now, Bitcoin’s only real use has been to facilitate illegal activities such as drug transactions, tax evasion, avoidance of capital controls, or money laundering. (source)

Of how and why we are bad at supporting the right innovation

Why are the two most hyped technical innovation of the past 20 years, the blockchain and artificial intelligence, diminishing human well-being instead of enhancing it? Why are we investing in things that make our problems worse, when the world is facing environmental collapse? My working hypothesis is that the financial world will put money into anything that promises returns, with little humanitarian concerns. They lead the dance; and governments the world over have been captured into supporting anything that promises GDP growth. If I am right, it is important to decouple support to innovations from their growth implications, and throw our institutional support behind technologies that uphold human well-being over capital growth. Jason Hickel has some interesting thoughts in his book Less is More, and Mazzucato has forcefully made the point across the arc of her work. Time will tell; and I am confident that better minds than mine will cast more light onto the matter. But this question can no longer wait, and if you are working in one of these two tech ecosystems, you may want to ask your employer, and yourself, some hard questions.

Update 1

Thanks to all the fine folks that reacted to this piece, and gave me useful suggestions. Many people pointed out counterexamples (I owe this particularly nice one to Raffaele Miniaci). But of course, it is not a problem of finding counterexamples, but to assess the overall net impact of this particular bit of technological development on society. My answer may be wrong, but I am fairly confident that my question is right.

Another objection comes from Yudhanjaya Wijeratne, who says that, without giving a definition of AI, the whole first part is meaningless. I went back to Mateos-Garcia’s definition, which he borrowed from Brian Arthur:

Machines able to behave reasonably in a wide range of circumstances.

Depending on how you interpret “reasonably” and “wide”, this indeed captures everything from deep learning for facial recognition to the individually trained spam filter in my personal install of Thunderbird. The reason for this choice is probably that it enables a statistical test for structural change: in 2012 everything changed, more or less at the same time as an influential paper by Krizhewsky et. al was published. Output of AI papers went way up.

I am looking for a socio-economic definition, not a technological one. These technologies each catalyzed a “scene” of researchers, companies, investors, governments etc. What values and visions do these scenes embed? What do they want? The libertarian streak of the blockchain gang is clear. With AI, this is less obvious because AI has a much longer history, and you cannot define it technologically. I guess when I am talking about “AI” in this article, I refer to its post-2012 scene, with some fuzziness but still quite identifiable. This excludes the spam filter on my e-mail client, and should take care of Yudhanjaya’s objection. It also raises concern, for the surveillance-authoritarian streak that this scene has.

Update 2, 2024-11-04

Some time has gone by since this post, and we now know a bit more about real-world use cases of AI. Cory Doctorow has provided a helpful summary. It is a bit of a black book, unfortunately. An excerpt is copied below; or you could read the entire post on his blog.

The real AI harms come from the actual things that AI companies sell AI to do. There’s the AI gun-detector gadgets that the credulous Mayor Eric Adams put in NYC subways, which led to 2,749 invasive searches and turned up *zero* guns:

https://www.cbsnews.com/newyork/news/nycs-subway-weapons-detector-pilot-program-ends/

Any time AI is used to predict crime – predictive policing, bail determinations, Child Protective Services red flags – they magnify the biases already present in these systems, and, even worse, they give this bias the veneer of scientific neutrality. This process is called “empiricism-washing,” and you know you’re experiencing it when you hear some variation on “it’s just math, math can’t be racist”:

https://pluralistic.net/2020/06/23/cryptocidal-maniacs/#phrenology

When AI is used to replace customer service representatives, it systematically defrauds customers, while providing an “accountability sink” that allows the company to disclaim responsibility for the thefts:
https://pluralistic.net/2024/04/23/maximal-plausibility/#reverse-centaurs

When AI is used to perform high-velocity “decision support” that is supposed to inform a “human in the loop,” it quickly overwhelms its human overseer, who takes on the role of “moral crumple zone,” pressing the “OK” button as fast as they can. This is bad enough when the sacrificial victim is a human overseeing, say, proctoring software that accuses remote students of cheating on their tests:

https://pluralistic.net/2022/02/16/unauthorized-paper/#cheating-anticheat

But it’s potentially lethal when the AI is a transcription engine that doctors have to use to feed notes to a data-hungry electronic health record system that is optimized to commit health insurance fraud by seeking out pretenses to “upcode” a patient’s treatment. *Those* AIs are prone to inventing things the doctor never said, inserting them into the record that the doctor is supposed to review, but remember, the only reason the AI is there at all is that the doctor is being asked to do so much paperwork that they don’t have time to treat their patients:

https://apnews.com/article/ai-artificial-intelligence-health-business-90020cdf5fa16c79ca2e5b6c4c9bbb14

My point is that “worrying about AI” is a zero-sum game. When we train our fire on the stuff that isn’t important to the AI stock swindlers’ business-plans (like creating AI slop), we should remember that the AI companies could halt all of that activity and not lose a dime in revenue. By contrast, when we focus on AI applications that do the most direct harm – policing, health, security, customer service – we *also* focus on the AI applications that make the most *money* and drive the most investment.